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Abstract 
 
 
 
 
The formation of ESDP (European Security and Defense Policy) is one of the 
most important building blocks shaping the European security structure and the 
European integration process since the beginning of the 21st century. Even though 
the integration engine was injured by the rejection of the European Constitutional 
Treaty in France and the Netherlands, the ESDP can be seen as currently one of 
the most dynamic areas in European integration. This dynamism takes the 
attention of theorists attempting to explain the security and defence integration 
from their own point of view. Social Constructivism, Realism and Realist version 
of Liberalism, namely Liberal Intergovernmentalism (LI) are three theories 
having different emphasis on not only the security integration of the European 
Union (EU) but also the definition of the security concept.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The formation of ESDP (European Security and Defense Policy) is one of 
the most mainstream developments shaping the European security structure and 
the European integration process since the beginning of the 21st century. Despite 
the fact that the integration engine was injured by the rejection of the European 
Constitutional Treaty in France and the Netherlands, the ESDP can be seen as 
currently one of the most dynamic areas in European integration. 
After the failure of the European Defense Community in 1954 and other 
attempts to create a European security policy, by the spring of 1998, the UK 
began to give a serious importance to defense issues. It was a turning point led to 
rapid developments in the formation of the ESDP. 
In the development of the ESDP, the Saint-Malo declaration was the one 
of the most important steps. No longer content with the quest for a security and 
defense identity from inside NATO, and no longer prepared to use the WEU as a 
proxy, the EU itself sought to generate ESDP, which, as it arose from the Saint-
Malo declaration of December 1998, explicitly called for the capacity for 
autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces (Hill 2005 p.183).  
St Malo raised a number of challenges. Despite these challenges, the 
institutional implications were rapidly resolved and the EU in Brussels created 
new bodies, the High Representative for the CFSP (HR-CFSP—Javier Solana) 
and advisory Policy Unit (PU) of HR-CFSP; the Political and Security 
Committee; the European Union Military Committee (EUMC); and the EU 
military staff (EUMS) (Hill 2005).  
Trend towards military power is now to be found in the ESDP agreed at 
the June 1999 Cologne European Council, which committed the EU to having a 
60.000 person rapid reaction force (RRF) ready by the end of 2003 (Manners 
2002 p. 237). 
In December 1999, in the Helsinki Headline Goal (HHG), appropriate 
resources for European missions, including the Petersberg Tasks, set out in the 
Petersberg Declaration, adopted at the Ministerial Council of the Western 
European Union (WEU) in June 1992, was determined. Resources and 
deficiencies were identified in Capabilities Commitments Conference (November 
2000) and Capabilities Improvements Conference (November 2001). At third 
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conference, in May 2003, they achieved some results and Member States agreed 
on some contributions. When we came to the year 2003, the EU has started 
become the military actor, and ongoing political developments demonstrated that 
the EU attempted further security and defence integration. 
 
1.1 Purpose and Research Questions 
In general, the specific purpose of this thesis is to form a theoretical 
approach that could provide a better understanding of the European Security and 
Defence Policy, and could demonstrate its necessity. 
This study emphasizes on the evolution of the ESDP, its background, 
political developments behind the evolution of the ESDP, and the application of 
three theories on the ESDP. As a result of the study, I will try to demonstrate that 
Social Constructivism can explain the evolution of the ESDP whereas the Liberal 
Intergovernmentalism and Realism are not sufficient enough to explain it. I 
attempt to compare these three theories since I believe that this will make easier to 
understand the contribution of the Social Constructivism. 
 
Finally, this study tries to answer the following questions: 
 
  -What are the political developments behind the evolution of the ESDP? 
  
-Could we say that these political developments provide an applicability of    
Constructivist theory on the security and defence cooperation in the EU? 
 
-Why does Liberal Intergovernmentalism and Realism, relatively to the 
Social Constructivism, fail in explaining the security and defence 
cooperation in the EU? 
 
1.2 Methodology 
 
This paper takes the European Security and Defence Policy, which is one aspect 
of European Integration, as a case. Then, three theories, which are Social 
Constructivism, Realism (and Neo-Realism), and Liberal Intergovernmentalism, 
are applied on this case. Consequently, this paper can be regarded as a theory 
testing case study; however, this paper is not only theory-confirming but also 
theory-infirming case study since the paper claims that the Liberal 
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Intergovernmentalism and Realism are not adequate, relatively to the Social 
Constructivism, to explain the evolution of the ESDP whereas the Social 
Constructivism is almost adequate. In other words, after defining three theories, I 
demonstrate that the evolution of the ESDP can be almost explained by Social 
Constructivism.  
 
1.3 Material 
 
The material I used in this study is divided into two groups: theoretical and 
empirical. In the theoretical part of my thesis, I use Andrew Moravcsik, Antje 
Wiener, Thomas Diez, Ben Rosamond, Thomas Christiansen, and Kenneth Waltz 
as my secondary sources. Then, as empirical materials, I used official papers of 
the EU such as declarations and treaties (especially EU’s drafted constitutional 
treaty). These are primary resources I used. Moreover, secondary sources I used 
in my thesis are academic journals and books of Christopher Hill, Maria 
Strömvik, Brian White and Nelson and Stubb. 
 
 
1.4 Organization of the Thesis 
 
The first part is the introduction mentioning the purpose, research questions, 
methodology and materials of the thesis. The second part explains the theoretical 
framework, and thus gives a general idea about Liberal Intergovernmentalism and 
Social Constructivism. The next part briefly mentions the evolution of the 
European Security and Defence Policy including its background and the political 
developments behind it. Fourth part is the application of Realism (and Neo-
Realism), Liberal Intergovernmentalism and Social Constructivism on the ESDP. 
Finally, last chapter will give a brief conclusion on the findings of the thesis in 
accordance with the answers of research questions. 
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2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Since the theoretical framework of the ESDP is the combination of Realism, 
Liberal Intergovernmentalism and Social Constructivism in this paper, this 
chapter will attempt to explain these three theories briefly.  
 
2.1. REALISM 
 
Realism is a state-centric approach. Realists give an importance to the national 
interests and power in international life. States decide to determine their interests 
and how to pursue them. The most important thing is the survival for the states. 
Stanley Hoffman (1966) defines this by saying that member states are not 
obsolete at all. Realists claim that also everything existing in the world is 
measurable, material and observable. That is why; there is no place for ideas, 
norms and culture in realism (Tonra 2000 p. 8). Besides, according to Realism, 
interests are exogenously given (Fierke and Wiener 1999 p. 724). 
Realism is said to be based on three main assumptions. ‘First, the state is the 
dominant actor on the international scene, and is capable acting as a coherent, 
unitary and rational unit. 
Second, states recognize no authority above them so in international relations, 
there is a state of anarchy, or lack of hierarchy, which forces states to self help. 
Third, in anarchy, politics is dominated by military considerations and by the 
fragility of trust and cooperation. War is therefore always a possibility (Hill, 
2005). 
Neo-realism takes the world as anarchy, a field having no sovereign. In 
that field, states must survive. Since there is no sovereign, there is no mechanism 
preventing states from threats in international politics. Thus, the war is possible, 
and military power is necessary to survive in war. Power of states is also 
important to survive. They try to increase their power relatively to each other. 
One power’s domestic or foreign success can decrease the one of other. Neo-
realism claims that powers do not behave the same all the time; however, if they 
do not behave like this, they probably disappear from history (Waltz, 1979 
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pp.102-28; Mearsheimer 2001, pp. 29-54). About the anarchical condition of 
international politics, he claims: 
 
 “A self-help system is one in which those who do not help themselves, or who do so less 
effectively than others, will fail to prosper, will lay themselves open to dangers, will suffer. Fear 
of such unwanted consequences stimulates state to behave in ways that tend toward the creation of 
balances of power’’ (Waltz). 
 
As mentioned above, realists and neo-realists claim that international 
system is anarchic and in the state of anarchy, sovereign nation states behave 
conflictually. As Weber says that individual war may be stopped from time to 
time but war cannot be finished completely (Weber, 2005 pp.13-35). 
 Besides, for Realists and Neo-realists, the ultimate goal in this 
environment is to survive for the states. Weber says: ‘This is their overriding 
interest. The only way that states can reasonably ensure their survival is to 
increase their power and therefore be less likely to attack them’ (ibid.). 
 Realists and neo-realists also agree that there is no exit from international 
anarchy. It is not realistic to assume a formation of a world government could 
since states will never feel in secure enough. That is why they will never trust 
enough each other in order to give up their autonomy to a world government. 
 In contrast to common thoughts of realists and neo-realists, there are issues 
they disagree. First, they disagree about the human nature. Hans Morgenthau, 
who is a realist, claims that the nature of man is fundamentally detected. He 
argues that even though man is not purely evil, he certainly has the original sin. 
Thus, he means thinking pessimist about man’s behaving is the only realistic way 
in international politics. That is why; international politics will be anarchical and 
conflictual due to the nature of man.  
 Besides, neo-realists claim that instead of finding natural causes of 
conflict, social causes of the conflict should be found. Waltz, who is a neo-realist 
thinker, claims that the organization of social relations demonstrates the existence 
of the war. The nature of man is not too important. The reason of this result is that 
good man behaves badly in bad social organizations, and bed man could be 
prevented from behaving badly in good social organizations. The war takes place 
if the states are in a bad social organization. According to Waltz, bad social 
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organization is international anarchy. Waltz says: ‘International anarchy is the 
permissive cause of war’. That is why; realists and neo-realists think different in 
the conceptualization of international anarchy. Realists argue that it is just the 
environment in which sovereign nation-state act whereas neo-realists claim that 
international anarchy describes the social relations among sovereign nation 
states that causally explain why wars occur (Weber, 2005 pp. 13-35). 
 
2.1.1 Liberal Intergovernmentalism 
 
Some EU scholars explain Liberal Intergovernmentalism (LI) as a 
theoretical school with no disciples and a single teacher: Andrew Moravcsik; 
however, LI is an application of rationalist Institutionalism to the field of 
European Integration (Schimmelfening 2004 p.75 in Diez and Wiener). In other 
words, as Nelsen and Stubb point out that Moravcsik and the rest of the field do 
not say completely different things. Moravcsik is a rationalist and an 
institutionalist. He says that actors generally behave rationally to reach their 
material interests, and institutions created by these actors affect the behavior 
deeply. According to his view of international relations, sovereign states can 
accept the cooperation if this is in their interest. That is why; they can reject the 
integration when their interests change (Stubbs and Nelson, 2003 pp. 239-254). 
To begin with, Liberal intergovernmentalism has the two-level game 
understanding which means that governments bargain with other governments 
and with their domestic electoral district (Putnam 1993; Moravcsik 1998 in 
Merand 2006). Furthermore, Moravcsik utilizes Robert Putnam’s two-level 
bargaining model (1988) since Moravcsik argues that international institutions are 
created to represent domestic interests in an intergovernmental bargaining arena. 
Integration can occur if preferences of domestic interest groups of the negotiating 
states can converge. Moreover, for the integration, negotiators which are likely to 
win should be compliance with the creation of institutions. 
The main idea of LI is that the integration is related with the interests of 
the states themselves. In other words, governments’ preferences have the 
supremacy in this theory; however, it is also close to the neo-realism since 
governments look for a common ground in intergovernmental negotiations after 
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determining their interests. Nevertheless, finally, all states do not prefer to give up 
more sovereignty and power than necessary. 
In contrast to neo-realists, Liberal intergovernmentalists do not believe 
that state preferences are naturally conflictual and convergent, including a 
collective action problem. Intergovernmentalism is close to the Neo-liberalism 
thought which targets catching the complex interdependence of states in the 
international system and thus departing from those who treat states as billiard 
balls or black boxes with fixed preferences for wealth, security or power 
(Keohane and Nye 1977; Moravcsik 1993: 481). 
In LI theory, Moravcsik argues that governments determine their national 
preferences in intergovernmental bargaining under the influence of domestic and 
international forces. National preferences are explained as an ‘ordered and 
weighted set of values placed on future substantive outcomes … that might result 
from international political interaction’ (Moravcsik 1998 p.24 cited in Merand 
2006).  
Moravcsik divides his theory in to six core assumptions (Moravcsik, 1993 
p. 481). The first one is the rational state behaviour (ibid.). Second, he claims that 
groups express preferences, governments bring them together and governments’ 
preferences are determined (ibid. p. 483). These groups are producers since their 
economic interests shape national preferences (ibid. p. 517).  
Third, it is argued that there are three factors shaping governments’ policy 
preferences. First of all, there should be important benefits of the cooperation.  
Moreover, costs and benefits should be clear. Last, influence of producers on 
policy formation is important. These factors affect also the flexibility of 
governments in negotiations.  
The fourth assumption argues that governments are less flexible about 
giving concessions from their interests. They try to reach on an agreement in the 
lowest common denominator (ibid. p. 501). According to Moravcsik, the lowest 
common denominator bargaining is not the result of actions of supranational 
leaders, but domestic interest groups (ibid. p. 491). 
Fifth, LI theory argues that issue areas are separate. They become 
connected if there is no solution. The connection involves some financial and 
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symbolic concessions not real issues. Finally, the nature of the issue brings 
important constraints to a government, and this creates predictable patterns of 
bargaining (ibid. p. 488). 
Moravcsik argues the difference between preferences and strategies. On 
one hand, he points out preferences of states are autonomous from other actors in 
the international arena, and thus come before the interstate bargaining. On the 
other hand, strategies are policy options which can be changed to protect national 
interests (Moravcsik 1997 p. 519). Moravcsik claims that to guarantee the security 
of national interests and to become a part of the European integration are not 
contradictory to each other. Even, he asserts that European integration ‘can best 
be explained as a series of rational choices made by state leaders’ (Moravcsik 
1998 pp.18-21). He demonstrates this, Moravcsik presents three stages. First, state 
leaders form ‘a consistent set of national preferences’. These preferences are 
based on permanent national interests. Second, the states develop strategies based 
on these preferences. The strategies aim to provide the states to encounter 
domestic and international demands and pressures (ibid.). Finally, states decide 
whether they fit their agreements in institutional frameworks. For instance, if 
states decide to pool their sovereignties, they give their right to veto decisions up.  
According to Moravcsik, states can pool their sovereignty if they are 
persuaded that cooperation will be more useful in order to keep their national 
preferences (ibid. pp. 20, 67). This means that institutions do not have the 
capability to change interests and preferences of states. In this point, Moravcsik 
claims that states pool their sovereignty in the realm of ‘low politics’ like 
economy and trade than ‘high politics’ like security and defence. In other words, 
Moravcsik points out economic interests drive the European integration (1998 p. 
473). Rational preferences are mostly economic issues since the nature of 
European integration is economic. Governments decide the integration for their 
economic advantages.  
Furthermore, Moravcsik mentions the importance of geopolitical 
preferences. Not only economic preferences but also geopolitical preferences are 
important for the explanation of the creation of the Union and the extensive 
policies of the EU integration (Moravcsik 1998. p. 476, Schimmelfennig 2001 p. 
79). 
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The theory of formation of national preference, the theory of interstate 
bargaining and functional theory of institutional choice are useful to explain 
liberal intergovernmentalism.  
First, the theory of formation of national preference attempts to explain 
national preferences. According to Moravcsik, economic interests determine 
national preferences in the European integration process. Moravcsik says: 
 
The central prediction of this approach is that when economic integration is perceived to generate 
positive geopolitical externalities, governments tend to favor integration; whereas when 
integration is perceived to generate negative geopolitical consequences, they are more likely to 
oppose it (Moravcsik 2005). 
Moravcsik also asserts that state preferences are determined by the distributional 
conflict and bargaining power at the domestic and the international level 
(Schimmelfennig 2001 p. 49). 
Furthermore, Moravcsik argues that the theory of interstate bargaining 
tries to explain the efficiency and distributional outcomes of EC negotiations 
(Moravcsik 2005). According to Moravcsik, efficiency is unproblematic relatively 
since negotiators, first, give an importance to the distribution of benefits, shaped 
by the relative power of national governments regarded as asymmetrical policy 
interdependence:  
 
Patterns of interdependence underlie credible threats to veto, exit and exclude other governments, 
as well as, though secondarily, linkages between issues and offers of side payments (Moravcsik, 
2005 p.11).
According to Schimmelfening, Bargaining theoryargues that the outcome of
international negotiations, that is, whether and on which terms cooperation comes
about depends on the relative bargaining power of the actors. Bargaining power is a
result of the asymmetrical distribution of information, and the benefits of a specific
agreement (Schimmelfening 2004 p. 77 in Diez and Wiener,). This means that actors 
having much and better information will have more bargaining power. They also 
gain their outcomes they demand by threatening them with non-cooperation 
(ibid.). 
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Number of scholars, who support reflectivist, constructivist or sociological 
institutionalist approaches in general, have criticized Moravcsik’s formation of 
national preferences model. For example, Wendt and Ruggie claim that 
membership is important to change preferences and identities of national elites 
who are part of the EU integration process (Sandholtz 1993, Risse 1996, Lewis 
1998 cited in Pollack). They also claim that preference formation model of 
Liberal Intergovernmentalism ignores the endogenous effects of EU membership 
even though those effects are one of the fundamental features of the integration 
process.  
Finally, as an explanation of functional theory, states establish 
international institutions to remove the first and second- order problems in 
international cooperation. Non- cooperative behaviour is a rational choice; 
however, it leaves all states inferior in the end (Schimmelfening 2004 p. 78 in 
Diez and Wiener). 
In conclusion, Liberal Intergovernmentalism basically argues that in the 
international arena, governments behave regarding their purposes and goals set 
domestically. Liberal Intergovernmentalists claim that since 1955, there are three 
factors convincing the governments for further integration in the EU: their 
economic interests, their bargaining power; and their credible commitments to 
transfer national sovereignty. 
 
2.2 SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIVISM 
A more radical view sees the international system itself, and its 
characteristic anarchical condition, as a social construction which can be altered 
or transformed by finding an alternative lens through which to conceptualize 
international relations (Wendt 1992). 
Constructivist approaches to the study of Europe are trendy since the early 
1990s. The ontology of the Social Constructivism is open to both material and 
social facts. As Checkel points out Social Constructivism focuses on the 
interaction of structures and agents since they are mutually constitutive rather 
than the causal explanations (Checkel 2006).  
Recently, many scholars has utilized the constructivist approach; however, 
there is not a unique “social constructivist theory” about European integration 
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even international relations in general. Due to this problem, many scholars writing 
in constructivist approach contrasts it to the prominent theories of European 
integration such as neo-functionalism, liberal intergovenmentalism and multi-
level governance, which are firmly committed to a rationalist ontology instead of 
making a direct comparison (ibid.). 
Constructivist view sees that decisions of political actors such as nation states are 
not always the result of calculations of material benefit. In contrast, opinions and 
actions of decision makers come from the relationships with other people. That is 
why; Constructivism claims that norms, ideas, identities and interests can change. 
Nelsen and Stubb agree that the EU, with its levels of government and many 
formal and informal institutions, provides an ideal arena for constructivist 
exploration. They also add that the Constructivist view of Checkel gives an 
importance to institutions too much since Checkel argues that via interaction, 
institutions help to shape the identities and interests of member states within 
them; and learning is one of the components of this process.  In sum, Checkel 
tries to understand that effects of new social relations at the European level upon 
the perception of interests of EU’s member states (Stubbs and Nelson, 2003 pp. 
351-360). 
Risse (2004 p.160 in Diez and Wiener) defines Social Constructivism as ‘a 
truism that social reality does not fall from heaven, but that human agents 
construct and reproduce it through their daily practices. Since defining the 
Constructivism as a truism would not be a clear definition, he explains 
constructivism as ‘based on a social ontology which insists that human agents do 
not exist independently from their social environment and its collectively shared 
systems of meanings’. (Risse 2004 in Diez and Wiener). This means that agents 
and structures interact each other; identities, preferences and interests are the 
result of this interaction. They are not exogenously given. Constructivists assert 
that interests are socially constructed as a result of social interaction (Checkel 
1998; Wendt 1992, 1994; Wind 1997 in Rosamond 2000). 
This helps to understand why Social constructivism views the multilateral 
cooperation and political integration as the result of social interaction and 
collective identity formation. It does not accept that the states’ interests are fixed. 
Knutsen (1997 pp. 281-2 in Rosamond 2000) also has a similar argument:  
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‘the structures of international politics are outcomes of social interactions, that states are not static 
subjects, but dynamic agents, that state identities are not given, but reconstituted through complex, 
historical overlapping practices and therefore variable, unstable, constantly changing; that the 
distinction between domestic politics and international relations are tenuous.’ 
Wendt (1999) argues that this view provides to understand international 
cooperation. In the same way, according to the Social Construction of Europe 
(Christiansen et al. 2001), the Constructivist approach on the European integration 
process demonstrates that integration is the result of a common things such as 
common institutions, common rules, norms and standards (Wendt 1999 ch. 7; 
Checkel 2001a in Diez and Wiener 2004). Institutions and norms are the part of 
the international environment and states give an importance them. The EU as an 
institution has certain principles such as democracy, the rule of law, human rights, 
and free market. These principles are important to constitute a European identity; 
and states become socialized with institutional aims (Hill, 2005). 
The Constructivist approach on the European integration process can be 
detailed with the Europeanization, which includes the political, economical and 
social changes on the member states as a result of the EU membership (Wong 
2005 p. 135). Europeanization has three components which are national 
adaptation, national projection, and identity reconstruction. First, the EU is 
regarded as a part of national politics of member states. Second, domestic policies 
are sent to the EU. Third, since identity is transferred to the EU gradually, 
European identity gives a direct to national identities (ibid. p. 137).  
As mentioned above, Risse says that social constructivists define 
institutions as social structures so institutions have an impact on agents and their 
behavior. Thus, social constructivism follows the ‘logic of appropriateness’ and 
differs from rationalism in this sense:  
 
‘Human actors are imagined to follow rules that associate particular identities to particular 
situations, approaching individual opportunities for action by assessing similarities between 
current identities and choice dilemmas and more general concepts of self and situations’ (March 
and Olsen 1998 p. 951 in Diez and Wiener 2004 p.163).  
 
According to Risse, the logic of appropriateness claims that actors attempt 
to choose the appropriate rule in a given social situation. This means that social 
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institutions such as the EU are not external to actors. Instead, actors are affected 
by the social institutions. 
This is contrast to the Rationalism since it claims that social institutions 
such as the EU constrain the actors’ behaviors through identities and preferences 
they give. In other words, Rationalism follows the ‘logic of consequentialism’ 
(March and Olsen 1989, 1998 ibid.).  This logic of action aims to maximize 
interests and preferences of one side.  
Risse (2004 in Diez and Wiener) mentions the communicative and 
discursive practices as a final characteristic feature of social constructivist 
approaches. He argues that to explain social behavior, the words, language and 
communicative expression should be taken into account seriously. 
Risse points out the contribution of the application of Habermasian theory 
of communicative action to the communicative practices in the European 
integration. Habermas (1981, 1992), Müller (1994), and Risse (2000) concentrate 
on arguing and reason-giving which prove that not only strategic calculations but 
also the principles and norms are important (Risse 2004 in Diez and Wiener). 
In addition, Risse mentions that interests, preferences, and the perceptions 
are not fixed. They are under the rule of discursive challenges. Due to this reason, 
if argumentative rationality overcomes, actors will not try to maximize their 
interests and preferences. Instead, they will be ready to change their interests via 
better argument. Risse argues that this view will provide to study European 
institutions as bargaining arenas open for a reasoned consensus to solve common 
problems. (Diez  and Wiener 2004).         
Finally, according to Rosamond, constructivism can be used to criticize 
the notions of intergovernmentalism. He mentions that Christiansen and 
Jorgensen (1999) criticize liberal intergovernmentalist view on the processes of 
treaty reform. They point out liberal intergovernmentalism views treaty reforms 
as the product of bargains and the result of the negotiations of actor’s interests 
(Rosamond 2000). 
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3. THE EUROPEAN SECURITY AND 
DEFENCE POLICY (ESDP) 
 
3.1 A Background 
 
This chapter will explain the evolution of the ESDP; give a background and 
mentioning political developments affecting its evolution.  
 
3.1.1 The Amsterdam Treaty and the European Security and Defence 
Policy (ESDP) 
 
The 1996-1997 Intergovernmental Conference had discussed many issues about 
the defense dimension in the EU. Some member states supported that the EU 
should integrate the WEU, while others supported that security and defence issues 
should remain intergovernmental. Due to different views between the EU member 
states, the conference continued until June 1997. The Amsterdam treaty brought 
amendments to CFSP part in the Maastricht treaty. For instance, the treaty 
emphasized a High Representative of the CFSP. It would increase the 
coordination and effectiveness and create the Policy Planning and Early Warning 
Unit (PPEWU), which would help the creation of a ground for joint actions and 
common positions (Ojanen 1999 p.6). Besides joint actions and common 
positions, common strategies were introduced in the Amsterdam treaty. The 
inclusion of the Petersberg tasks, which are humanitarian and rescue, peace-
keeping, and even peace-making tasks, can be regarded as the most important 
novelty in the Amsterdam treaty (ibid.) since France, Germany and UK had 
different views.
 
France and Germany proposed that the Western European Union 
(WEU) should merge with the EU while UK suggested that defence issues should 
stay outside the EU (Gourlay and Remacle 1998 p.88 in Romsloe No.04/22). 
Despite these novelties, it is considered that the Amsterdam Treaty just 
kept the status quo since real progress aimed in the EU foreign and security policy 
could not be realized (Ojanen 1999 p.6). 
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3.1.2 St. Malo Initiative 
 
The European Union needs to be in a position to play its full role on the international stage. This 
means making a reality of the Treaty of Amsterdam, which will provide the essential basis for 
action by the Union. It will be important to achieve full and rapid implementation of the 
Amsterdam provisions on CFSP. This includes the responsibility of the European Council to 
decide on the progressive framing of a common defence policy in the framework of CFSP. The 
Council must be able to take decisions on an intergovernmental basis, covering the whole range of 
activity set out in Title V of the Treaty of European Union  (Joint declaration art. 1). 
 
Before the creation of the ESDP, European countries were primarily 
relying on NATO for defence cooperation, even though some efforts was spent to 
improve EU’s external activities and defence responsibilities; however, at the 
Franco-British summit in St-Malo, 3-4 December 1998, the European defence 
project gained a new and rapid dimension. Many declarations and proposals 
followed the St Malo Conference. 
Even though the UK insisted that defence issues should stay outside the 
EU, interestingly the newly elected Blair government in the UK demonstrated that 
they are not happy due to the European lack of power in defence issues. UK 
suggested that the EU should have responsibility in its military operations, and 
should have autonomous forces which could take part of the operations which the 
US did not want to take part (Howorth cited in Hill, 2005 p.185).  
Blair gave up traditional British policy for two reasons. First, diplomatic 
efforts to bring peace to Kosovo became unsuccessful. Blair claimed that the EU 
needed to reinforce Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and WEU was 
not enough to create an impact in the disputes of the world. 
Second, Blair wanted to make the UK a more influential member in the 
EU. Defence was the best choice since Britain was one of two EU members 
having the military capacity to act its power outside NATO (Grant 1999). 
Finally, The UK got together with France and the two countries issued a “Joint 
Declaration on European Defence” in St. Malo on December 4, 1998. The 
declaration was radical since it raised “the issues of European autonomous action, 
credible military forces, and a European defence industry (Haine 2004): 
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To this end, the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible 
military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to 
international crises (Joint Declaration art. 2). 
 
3.1.3 The Helsinki Headline Goals  
 
The Helsinki Headline Goal (HHG) was created at the European Council in 
Helsinki in December 1999. It was like a “force catalogue” which determined 
necessary resources for European missions. The goal was to make member states 
voluntarily take part in EU-led operations, deploying by 2003, up to 60 000 
persons for 60 days and sustaining them for at least one year (ibid.).  
The sixty-day limit concerned the deployment of full-size forces, whilst 
rapid reaction forces would have to be ready on shorter notice. An ad hoc 
Committee of Contributors was set in place, which would serve as a mechanism 
for dialogue, consultation and cooperation with partner states such as NATO 
member states and its non-EU European states, EU applicant states, and other 
potential partners. Were NATO assets to be used, non-EU European NATO states 
could join the operations if they so wished, whereas other states would have to be 
invited to join by the Council (Salmon and Shepherd 2003 pp. 71-72). This 
policy, however, caused problems in the working relationship between the EU 
and NATO. 
The Feira European Council in June 2000 established a Headline Task 
Force (HTF) mechanism, which would identify the capabilities the EU required to 
implement the Petersberg Tasks. The meeting also established four working 
groups between the EU and NATO on security, defining capability goals, EU 
access to NATO assets and capabilities, and permanent arrangements for relations 
between the two organisations. 
Via a series of “Pledging Conferences” – Capabilities Commitments 
Conference (November 2000) and Capabilities Improvements Conference  
(November 2001) –  this pool of resources was refined and deficiencies identified. 
Capabilities Commitment Conference gives the basic materials such as troops, 
planes, ships for the creation of an EU Rapid Reaction Force (RRF), which was 
the Helsinki European Council’s “Headline Goal” (Howorth 2002). 
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In November 2001, EU defence ministers met for the second time to 
discuss the progress achieved in meeting the Helsinki Headline Goals at the 
Capabilities Improvement Conference. New offers of capability inputs had been 
received but forty shortfalls still remained, of which many were critical to the 
military effectiveness of the ESDP. The conference agreed to remedy the 
capabilities shortfalls by nationalizing defense efforts and improving 
compatibility between the national and multinational projects through a European 
Capability Action Plan (ECAP). The CIC Conclusions were then adopted by the 
European Council at Laeken on 15 December 2001 (ibid.). The European Council 
meeting in Laeken (December 2001) boldly declared that the EU “should be able 
to carry out the whole range of Petersberg tasks by 2003” (ibid.). 
In spite of the identified shortfalls, the ERRF was declared partly 
operational at the Leaken European Council in December 2001. The Seville 
European Council the following spring announced that the EU would be in a 
position to undertake its first crisis management operation in January 2003, by 
overtaking the UN police mission in Bosnia, and thus renamed the EU Police 
Mission (EUPM) (Salmon and Shepherd 2003 pp.79-80). 
 
3.1.4 The Nice Treaty and ESDP                       
 
The Nice Treaty was signed on March 10, 2001(European Communities 1991).  It 
revised some of the parts of CFSP and ESDP in the Amsterdam treaty. thus, the 
role of the EU in security and defence was changed under the same three pillars 
structure. In other words, there are some fundamental differences between 1997 
Amsterdam treaty and 2001 Nice treaty.  
First, the defence issues of the EU will directly be related with not WEU 
but the EU itself (EU Council 2000). As a result of this decision, many functions 
of the WEU were moved to the EU. A new military and political structure was 
created within the EU. This new military structure included the European Union 
Military Committee (EUMC) and the European Union Military Staff (EUMS), 
and the new political structure is the Political Security Committee (PSC) 
(Presidency Report on ESDP 2000). 
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Second, the EU would develop an EU military force consisting of 
approximately 60,000 troops. This military force would have a ability to receive 
responsibility for a task from peace-keeping to peace-making (ibid).  
Nevertheless, some arrangements of ESDP have created a tension between 
members since some EU member states supported that the EU should act 
autonomously from NATO in terms of the military capabilities while other 
member states supported that the EU could use tools and capabilities of NATO. 
Moreover, it was decided that the EU should take full responsibility in the 
conflict prevention areas and increase its capabilities for civilian crisis 
management.      
Besides these novelties, the Nice Treaty brought a number of changes 
which will affect the ESDP indirectly. One of these changes is the Enhanced Co-
operation clause in certain areas. 
  ‘Enhanced Cooperation’ (French Presidency Report on ESDP 2000) 
allows group of members to act in a specific policy area without consulting all 
Member States. The Nice Treaty brought Enhanced Co-operation clause to CFSP; 
however, this clause is not applied to the military co-operation. 
There are two arguments upon the changes made in the Nice treaty in 
terms of ESDP. One argument claims that the Nice treaty did not bring any 
progress on defence issues 24 while other argument says that the Nice Treaty 
provided ‘Brusselisation’ of EU Member States’ Foreign and Security and 
Defence policies.  
 
3.1.5. “Headline Goal 2010” 
 
The European Council adopted the Headline Goal 2010 on 17 June 2004. The 
document can be regarded as the continuation of the Helsinki Headline Goals. 
Since it left some issues unresolved, Member States decided “themselves to be 
able by 2010 to respond with rapid and decisive action applying a fully coherent 
approach to the whole spectrum of crisis management operations covered in the 
Treaty of the European Union (Schmitt 2004 p.98). The Headline Goal 2010 aims 
to improve European armed forces’ availability, interoperability, deployability 
and sustainability. Headline Goal 2010 was to shift the objective from quantity to 
quality (Howorth 2002). In fact, The Headline Goal has been created to fill the 
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lack of mobile forces, which should be ready in a very short notice if they become 
necessary. France, the UK and Germany presented this initiative in February 
2004. The forces are primarily used as a request of the UN. They could also be 
used without the request of the UN. On 16 May 2006, The Council on General 
Affairs and External Relations stated:  
 
“It is ensured that from January 2007 on, the EU will have the full operational capability to 
undertake two battle group size operations of rapid response ,including the ability to launch two 
such operations nearly simultaneously”(Council of European Union 2006). 
Moreover, the Headline Goal document established a civil-military cell 
within the EUMS that would act as an operation centre for rapid civil-military 
responses (Schmitt 2004 p.99). 
It also resolved the contradiction between a Kosovo-style capability and 
the requirements of the “war on terrorism” partially. Yet the war on terrorism 
requires different instruments from those involved in driving the Serbian army out 
of Kosovo. The newly created battle-groups, of which from seven to nine are 
projected for 2007, can be used for both types of operation. (Howorth 2002) 
Furthermore, with the Headline Goal document, the European Defence Agency 
(EDA)was established.  The European Security Strategy gave an importance to 
the establishment of the EDA, officially established by a Council Joint Action in 
July 2004, for European military resources. Moreover, it was established to 
support the Member States in issues related with the ESDP. Javier Solana, the 
High Representative for the CFSP, is the Head of the EDA. 
 
3.1.6. 2003: EU became a Military Actor 
 
On 31 March 2003, the EU’s first military operation, a peace-keeping mission in 
the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) was achieved, by taking 
over from a NATO force. The operation Concordia was a great political success 
even though it was modest military. Although people living in northern villages 
challenged the operation in September 2003, the EU established order again.  
When the operation finished, there was criminality problem in Macedonia so an 
EU police operation, Proxima succeeded Concordia on 15 December 2003.  
Concordia was important for the EU since it allowed the EU to test its new 
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procedures which cover every aspect of the mounting of a military operation from 
command and control, through use of force policy, to issues such as logistics, 
financing and legal arrangements and memoranda of understanding with host 
nations (Howorth 2002). 
In June 2003, the EU’s first autonomous operation, Operation Artemis, in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo, took place. The operation Artemis was a 
success, exemplifying rapid deployment, utilizing a single chain of command and 
well-trained troops along the lines of NATO procedures (Howorth 2005). France 
was the framework nation of the operation (Howorth 2002). With Operation 
Artemis the EU saw it can be successful in a peacekeeping operation even if it is 
far from Europe. 
The transfer of responsibility for the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH), in December 2004, Operation Althea, became the 
EU’s most ambitious military mission. 
Since the launch of the EU Police Mission in Bosnia (EUPM), the EU has 
launched sixteen missions under the Petersberg tasks. Twelve missions are still 
ongoing, of which four are civilian, five are policing missions, two are military 
missions, and one is mixed military-civilian (ibid.). 
Through these missions, the EU has demonstrated its ability to break out 
of its self-imposed conceptual paralysis concerning military operations. Despite 
the weaknesses and deficiencies discussed earlier, the EU is clearly not without 
considerable potential in relation to the use of force. In addition to the ground 
forces which have been – and will increasingly be – deployed in overseas 
missions, the EU could with no difficulty take on naval or air-combat missions 
against any conceivable adversary.  Officially, the EU’s agreed strategy involves 
the ability to intervene – essentially on humanitarian grounds and at the invitation 
of the UN – anywhere in the world.  But before that can happen, the EU needs to 
resolve a range of political dilemmas. 
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3.2 Main Political Developments behind the evolution 
of the ESDP 
 
Since 2003, the EU has started the military operations. These missions 
demonstrated the EU’s ability involving in military operations. Officially, the 
EU’s agreed strategy involves the ability to intervene –essentially on 
humanitarian grounds and at the invitation of the UN – anywhere in the world 
(Hill 2005 p.194). To realize this aim, EU began to initiatives to determine the 
real political objectives behind ESDP. The European Security Strategy, the 
‘European Union Minister for Foreign Affairs’ (EUMFA), ‘Structured 
Cooperation’ and the ‘Solidarity Clause’ formed in the Convention/IGC in 2004. 
This section will mention these political developments briefly. 
 
3.2.1 European Security Strategy 
 
European Security Strategy was drafted by Javier Solana and approved by the 
European Council on 12 December 2003. It is an important building block to 
understand the real political objectives behind ESDP. It aimed to harmonize the 
different views of the current and future member states without falling into lowest 
common denominator rhetoric (Hill 2003 p.195). The Strategy was entitled as ‘A 
Secure Europe in a Better World’.  Besides Solana, UK diplomat Robert Cooper 
has important contributions to the document with the humanitarian intervention 
theses (Cooper, 2003 in Hill). 
This initiative was especially important in the aftermath of the Iraq crisis 
which had increased internal divisions within the EU. The strategy paper is based 
on three central issues, 1) strengthening and extending the security zone around 
Europe, 2) establishing an effective multilateralism based on the framework of the 
UN, and 3) responding to the threats of terrorism, weapons of mass destruction 
and organized crime (Haine 2004 pp.8-9)  
The strategy begins with the recognition that Europe has never been ‘so 
prosperous, so secure nor so free’. It identifies new five threats: terrorism, 
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Weapons of Mass Destruction, failed states, organized crime and regional 
conflicts (Hill 2005 p.195).  
The second section includes strategic objectives of the EU. The strategic 
objectives are divided into two parts which are to construct security in the 
European region, and to contribute for a new international order. Emphasizing the 
use of trade and development policies in a conditional way is the most innovative 
feature in this section.  
The final section asserts that the policy implications of the EU should be 
more active, more capable and more coherent. Moreover, the document mentions 
the need for a greater capability for the EU to have the capacity to sustain several 
operations simultaneously. The document also remembers that EU military 
operations will be carried out hand in hand with humanitarian and civilian 
missions, so there should be coordination between the European civilian and 
military instruments: 
 
In contrast to the massive visible threat in the Cold War, none of the new threats is purely military; 
nor can any be tackled by purely military means. Each requires a mixture of instruments . . . In 
failed states; military instruments may be needed to restore order, humanitarian means to tackle 
the immediate crisis. Regional conflicts need political solutions but military assets and effective 
policing may be needed in the post conflict phase. Economic instruments serve reconstruction, and 
civilian crisis management helps restore civil government. The European Union is particularly 
well equipped to respond to such multi-faceted situations (See Wider Europe 2003). 
 
The document, finally includes a will of partnership first with the US and 
NATO, second with Russia, and then with other regional partners. The US and 
NATO are the first since ESS says that many of the EU force’s missions will be 
undertaken in cooperation with NATO: 
 
The EU-NATO permanent agreements, in particular Berlin Plus, enhance the operational 
capability of the EU and provide the framework for the strategic partnership between the two 
organisations in crisis management. This reflects our common determination to tackle the 
challenges of the new century (ibid.) 
 
This document is already an important step in the way towards a coherent 
security and defense policy for the EU. Haine points out several significant 
characteristics of this document. First, Haine calls this document as a threat-
driven for the first time in the EU. Second, the strategy was gradually added to the 
EU’s acquis communataire and identity in security policy. Two key concepts, 
‘preventive engagement’ and ‘effective multilateralism’ are important in the 
document: 
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‘Preventive engagement’ means the Union’s approach to stability and nation-building, which is far 
more comprehensive than the military method favoured by Washington. ‘Effective 
multilateralism’ captures the essence of the Union’s rule-based security culture. The European 
Security Strategy stresses that ‘the fundamental framework for international relations is the United 
Nations Charter. Strengthening the United Nations, equipping it to fulfill its responsibilities and to 
act effectively, is a European priority’(Haine 2004 p.52). 
 
 
3.2.2 The ‘European Union Minister for Foreign Affairs’ (EUMFA) 
 
The EUMC is the highest military body established within the Council. The 
EUMFA is the result of the Convention in 2004. As an institution, EUMFA can 
be regarded as the most important innovation of the European Convention. The 
aim of greater political coordination of the EU created the Union Minister for 
Foreign Affairs.  
 
The holder of this post, elected for a five-year term, will replace the 
rotating presidency. Like the High Representative, it is important to choose the 
holder of this post in terms of background, style and personality and it is also 
crucial the role of the ‘Foreign Minister’. The European Council appoints the 
Minister with qualified majority. Moreover, the Minister will be one of the Vice-
Presidents of the European Commission and a member of the college under the 
examination of the European Parliament.  
He or she will have the responsibilities of the HR-CFSP and of the 
Commissioner for External Relations. This means that he or she will have 
relations with the Council and the Commission. This dual function is good for 
consistency and unity of representation. Under the authority of the Council and in 
cooperation with the PSC, the EUMFA will also help the coordination of the 
civilian and military aspects of EU crisis management operations (Constitutional 
Treaty, article III-309(2)). The EUMC will give military advice and make 
recommendations to the PSC over the EU’s military issues which are the 
development of crisis management in its military aspects, the risk assessment of 
potential crisis, and the elaboration, assessment and review of capability goals. In 
crisis management, if the PSC demands, the EUMC will take ideas from the 
European Union Military Staff (EUMS) for developing strategic military options. 
With a decision of the Council, it will permit the Operation Commander to 
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employ in initial operational planning. During an operation, the EUMC will 
monitor the proper execution of military operations (Missiroli 2004). 
He or she will also chair the new Foreign Affairs Council (FAC). Moreover, he or 
she will have the right to coordinate the security and aid policies of the EU. The 
EUMFA will also have the responsibility in the preparation and the 
implementation of CFSP/ESDP. In addition, The EUMFA will be common voice 
of the Union in international organizations and at international conferences.  
Moreover, the EUMFA will lead an EU Diplomatic Corps, the European 
External Action Service, which is intended to be introduced within one year after 
entry into force of the Treaty (Duke 2000 in Hill 2005). The ‘European External 
Action Service’ is in Art. III-197 of the Constitutional Treaty. The ‘European 
External Action Service’ will involve officials of the Council, the Commission 
and seconded national diplomats (Missirolli 2004). 
This central pillar is intended to enhance the coordination, and thus 
increase the integration. The EUMFA can be regarded as the first clear form of 
supranational intergovernmentalism (Hill, 2005). Hill defines supranational 
intergovernmentalism as the phenomenon whereby a profusion of agencies of 
intergovernmentalism take root in Brussels and, through dialogue and 
socialization process, reaction to events, and a host of other dynamics, gradually 
create a tendency for policy to be influenced, formulated even driven from within 
that city (Hill 2005 p.182). 
 
3.2.3 ‘Structured Cooperation’ and the ‘Solidarity Clause’  
 
In the Convention and IGC, besides the formation of the EUMFA, two more 
issues were discussed. The first one was the way of increasing the political 
coordination of military capacity, and the second was the question of going 
further in the European collective defense (Hill 2003). Thus, ‘structured 
cooperation’ has emerged as a new instrument. It was attempted by France and 
Germany to move ‘enhanced cooperation’ of the TEU into one step further. 
‘Structured cooperation’ will give a right to small but militarily strong states to 
give a direct to the ESDP in the name of the EU. Those Member States whose 
military capabilities fulfill higher criteria and which have made more binding 
commitments to one another in this area with a view to the most demanding 
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missions shall establish permanent structured cooperation within the Union 
framework (article I-41(6)). This cooperation is governed by Article III-312 and 
by the Protocol on permanent structured cooperation established by Article I- 
41(6) and Article III-312 of the Constitution (Naert, 2005). The reason why this 
cooperation was governed by a specific ‘Protocol’ is that ‘the intrinsically 
exclusive character of the scheme and the parallel controversies over the Tervuren 
initiative triggered a negative reaction by some member states – from both the 
‘Atlanticist’ and the non-allied camps – that translated into a partial rewriting of 
Art. III-213 in the IGC’ (Missiroli 2004 p.150). 
 
Moreover, this Protocol points out the basic criteria for participation. The 
basic criteria includes the achievement of high military operational readiness with 
national and/or multinational force packages, and with pooling and/or specializing 
of means and capabilities; participation in the development of ‘major joint or 
European equipment programs’ and in the activities of the Defence Agency; and 
increased cooperation with a view to meeting agreed objectives concerning ‘the 
level of investment expenditure on defence equipment’ (ibid. p.151).  
It is necessary to mention that the final version of Art. III-213 points out 
QMV is used to form ‘permanent structured cooperation’; however, unanimity 
will be used for decisions and recommendations related with ‘permanent 
structured cooperation’.  
Furthermore, ‘permanent structured cooperation’ can be regarded as 
different from other attempts realized in the ESDP since those attempts were more 
voluntarily and less pressure. In addition, it is interesting the acceptation of the 
QMV in military and defence issues.  
However, structured cooperation can be regarded as a danger by many 
member states in two ways. First, member states chosen for ‘structured 
cooperation’ can lead discrimination problem between other member states. 
Second, ‘structured cooperation’ can be regarded as an alternative to NATO (Hill 
2005). Even though the UK supported to work in harmony with NATO, it did not 
reject structured cooperation. The reason behind this decision was to repair the 
relations, got worse after Iraq, with France and Germany. With the ‘structured 
cooperation’ attempt, member states having powerful combat units for 
 30
intervention in crisis areas will have a rapid response chance with the request of 
the UN. 
Another and arguably more fundamental innovation is the mutual 
assistance clause in article I-41(7):  
 
If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall 
have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance 
with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the 
security and defense policy of certain Member States. Commitments and cooperation in this area 
shall be consistent with commitments under the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which, for those States which are members of it, remains the 
foundation of their collective defense and the forum for its implementation. 
 
 
The mutual assistance clause is a sensitive issue.  While the Atlanticist 
states fear it may lead to a downgrading of the Alliance, the ‘neutral’ states fear 
there may be a possibility to give a decision they do not agree (Hill 2005). 
According to Naert (2005 p. 6), the stipulation that this obligation of aid and 
assistance “shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defense 
policy of certain Member States” raises questions as to the precise scope of this 
obligation. This is so because the said mutual assistance obligation is clearly 
incompatible with the neutrality of neutral Member States. However, the mutual 
assistance clause is a step to have common interests, rights and responsibilities. It 
seems necessary for the formation of a robust system. 
 
Finally, it is necessary to mention the Solidarity clause in article I-43. The 
solidarity clause in the EU Constitution is: 
 
1. The Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is 
the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster. The Union shall 
mobilize all the instruments at its disposal, including the military resources made available by the 
Member States, to: 
(a) – prevent the terrorist threat in the territory of the Member States; 
– protect democratic institutions and the civilian population from any terrorist attack; 
– assist a Member State in its territory, at the request of its political authorities, in the event of a 
Terrorist attack; 
(b) assist a Member State in its territory, at the request of its political authorities, in the event of 
a natural or man-made disaster. 
 
 
According to Arts. I-42 and III-231, this new solidarity clause would be 
implemented by the Council of Ministers and the Political and Security 
Committee. The solidarity clause did not lead to major challenges of member 
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states since it was limited to the ‘territory’ of the related member state (Missiroli 
2004). 
 
Nevertheless, Naert (2005 p. 10) argues that different obligations under the 
mutual defense clause and under the solidarity clause may lead to discussions 
over the respective scope of application of both provisions. In this respect, it 
appears that there is some overlap, in particular in the case of a terrorist attack that 
equally amounts to an act of aggression. 
 
4. APPLICATION OF THEORIES ON 
THE ESDP 
The European Union as a security and defence actor could not find a good 
place in mainstream international relations theories (Hill, 2005). Nevertheless, 
since 1999, EU has taken a long way in the security and defence cooperation. 
Thus, international relations theorists have tried to explain the development of 
security and defence cooperation, even integration.  
In this chapter, I will try to explain the evolution of the ESDP through the 
Realism (and Neo-realism), theory of Liberal Intergovernmentalism (LI) and the 
theory of Social Constructivism.  
 
4.1 ESDP and Realism 
Realists do not believe the international cooperation due to the anarchy. As 
mentioned above, Realism claims that survival and sovereignty are the basic for 
the states (Mearsheimer 1994/5, 10 in Hill); however, the rapid development in 
the formation of the ESDP demonstrated that realists should have found an 
explanation from the perspective of their theories.  
During the Cold War, since Neo-realists assumed that states are interested 
in survival and protection from threats, they thought that multilateral institutions 
may be established to work as an alliance towards a common threat. That is why; 
it was easy to explain the existence of the multilateral cooperation during the Cold 
War period. Nevertheless, this cooperation and political integration in Europe 
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continued after the Cold War even though the threats were altered. They had 
problems to explain this development.  
Along with Waltz, realists and other neo-realists claim that security policy 
is not concerned in the integration process of the EU. The anarchic structure of 
the international system does not let the systematic pressure of international 
institutions on nation states. Instead, John Mearsheimer (1994, 1995) asserts that, 
due to the fact that realists accept the formation of international institutions, they 
claim that states will always want to make pressure over these institutions in order 
to redefine and reform the ideas, binding effects and interests of these institutions. 
Realism assumes that member states transfer limited powers to institutions 
of the EU. That is why; member states govern the EU. According to Glarbo 
(2001), since member states want to maintain their sovereignties, they do not want 
further integration in high politics such as the security and defence policy. In 
other words, realism could not explain EU members’ transfer their sovereignty in 
military matters, and it does not believe that they could act coherently in the EU 
(Howorth in Hill, 2005). 
According to neo-realism, states prefer to decide alone in security and 
defence issues; and other military activities. Bull says that the European Union is 
inappropriate and incapable for this conception (Bull, 1983 in Howorth in Hill 
2005). However, Barry Posen (2004; 2006) claims that there is an explanation of 
the emergence of the ESDP from the neo-realist perspective, which is that the 
ESDP is the weak version of balance of power. Moreover, he assumes that in the 
formation of the ESDP, one more factor which is European identity is important. 
However, it is hard to derive this factor from the neo-realist perspective. 
Constructivist theory makes a contribution to the formation of the ESDP in this 
factor.  
Balance of power explanation is accepted by other realists; however, they 
claim that in the current unipolar world order this is irrational. They claim that 
ESDP is not for a balance of power but a reaction to the US, which did not spend 
an effort to solve the problem in the Balkans, and did not behave to Europe like 
its allies anymore (Brooks – Wohlforth 2005: 91 cited in Forsberg). 
In other words, Neo-realists argue that member states can use the EU’s security 
and defence policy as an instrument to balance of its power with the US. In other 
words, Realism claims that if the ESDP is developed, this will be the result of the 
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interests of member states. This perspective defines the EU’s security and defence 
policy as a bargaining between actors thinking about their interests; however, this 
view underestimates longer-term changes. In this point, Social Constructivist can 
be used to understand the process and dimensions which are ignored by Realists.  
Since Neo-realists see the military threats as the primary issue in the 
security, to be secure, it is needed a military capacity alone or together with the 
allies. Security policy is then a policy of the build-up and use of military force. 
Basically, Neo-realism gives an importance to military threats, military 
instruments to stop these threats, and the military capacity to be effective in the 
world order (Waltz 1979; Walt 1991; Mearsheimer 2001, cited in Rieker). 
Neo-Realists assume that states are concerned with security because the 
survival comes first, then the pursuit of other goals become important (Waltz, N. 
Kenneth 1979: 126). Classical Realism rejects this and argues that states want to 
maximize their power as an end. The assumption of security seeking says nothing 
about the states’ relationships towards each other as they think about their 
security, however, and as such is logically compatible with a collective rather 
than a competitive security system (Weber, 2005 pp. 13-35). Waltz claims that the 
states are egoistic and “self-regarding” (Waltz 1979: 91). Waltz says: “states 
[will] not enjoy even an imperfect guarantee of their own security unless they set 
out to provide it for themselves” (Waltz 1979: 201). Weber assumes that this 
definition means that the international system is a “self-help” system (Weber, 
2005 pp. 13-35).  
In general, Rationalists can explain the reasons of the EU’s ineffectiveness 
and incoherency in world politics; however, they cannot explain the changeable 
character of the EU. They also have difficulties in explaining the reason why 
member states are willing to establish common institutions in spite of the fact that 
they could not get any material gains. Constructivism argues that the reason of 
this is not material since states do follow not only material objectives, but also 
ideological motivations. 
Since Neo-realism, based on classical realism, claims that the international 
system is anarchic, and there is no authority to determine common rules, 
economic and military power is necessary to protect national interests of the state. 
The balance of power is achieved with an order in international system. Thus, 
multilateral cooperation is demanded if it is in the interests of the great powers. 
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International institutions have limited autonomy coming from the nation states. If 
national interests conflict with each other, multilateral cooperations disintegrate. 
 
4.1.1 ESDP and Liberal Intergovernmentalism 
 
When mentioning the EU integration theory, liberal intergovernmentalism 
and supranational institutionalism prefer to use the territory concept as a dominant 
or explanatory factor for European cooperation and integration. According to 
Howorth, first, the sovereign state as a unitary actor is involved in political 
bargaining. Then, supranational institutions as diverse actors at multiple levels 
involved in functional integration (Howorth in Hill 2005). 
Moravcsik (1998) argues that external and internal factors change states’ 
strategies; however, national identities, interests, and preferences of states are not 
affected by those factors. Social Constructivists are against this argument and 
assert that interests, especially national security interests and national identities 
are affected by external and internal factors (Jefferson et al. 1996 p.53; Risse and 
Sikkink 1999 p.11; Wendt 1999 p.170)  
Number of the Liberal Intergovernmentalists argues that states might 
accept to pool their sovereignty for security and defence policy; however, they 
would claim that this can happen if the most powerful states in the EU use their 
powers in order to shape the EU policy, and if their interests are consistent with it. 
This explanation is consistent with St. Malo initiative of the UK; however, they 
add that EU security policy disintegrate when the interests of the powerful states 
differ.  
Alan Milward, who has searched the historical background of the EU 
integration, asserts that European integration did not decrease national 
sovereignty but helped the reconstruction of European states. According to 
Milward, when we look at the origins of the EC, we see that nation states played 
the most important role in its formation (Milward, 1992, 12). However, like other 
liberal intergovernmentalists, he asserts that in foreign policy issues, this 
integration has taken place less than other areas such as monetary or agricultural 
affairs since governments have had a great autonomy in that field. However, this 
position leads a so-called democratic deficit, according to which decisions at the 
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European level are not subject to the same controls as decisions at the national 
level (Kaiser 1971, Sharpf 1999, Koenig- Archibugi 2002 in Hill). To remove this 
problem, it is necessary to support integration in foreign policy issues. 
 Moravcsik claims that ESDP is the result of bargains between EU 
Member States whose interests are driven by domestic politics. Even though,   
institutions of the EU have an influence, Moravcsik also argues that the decision 
which develops ESDP is the result of the national preferences formed in domestic 
politics of member states (Moravcsik 1991). In fact, Liberal intergovernmentalism 
claims that certain policies can be given to a supranational institutions since 
governments can increase their power via extra resources remaining from those 
policies against their domestic rivals (Hill, 2005). However, this can be in low 
politics because governments give up their control if it is in their interest, and 
foreign policy affairs such as ESDP are regarded as high politics. Thus, these 
issues are rigidly separated from integration in general. However, the rapid 
development in the evolution of ESDP since 1998 has demonstrated that high 
politics can be a part of the integration machine even though interests of 
governments are too important. 
Liberal Intergovernmentalism does not concern about military threats and 
military capacities. This means that it is not much interested in security issues. 
Instead, LI gives much importance to economic interests. Nevertheless, 
Moravcsik explains that geopolitical threats and security concerns were included 
in the formation of the EU. 
On the other hand, according to Smith and School (2004), liberal 
intergovernmentalism faces two challenges while explaining security and defense 
integration. First of all, since most foreign policy decisions are given in 
accordance with the decision of elites, this policy area does not involve domestic 
interest groups thus, two-level bargaining model may not work here. Smith and 
School assert that domestic interest groups generally do not form strong opinions 
on security and defense policy. If liberal intergovernmentalism worked, domestic 
actors should have had the capacity to influence their governments during 
negotiations in forming a security and defense policy. According to Smith and 
School, this is a problem in liberal intergovernmentalism’s applicability.  
Second, according to Smith and School (ibid), liberal 
intergovernmentalism claims that domestic constituents form preferences for or 
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against defense and security policy integration; however, in contrast to economic 
policy, to form preferences in the defence and security issues with their gains and 
losses is too difficult. Moreover, they give an example that domestic actors could 
determine whether or not an economic policy would increase prosperity; however, 
such a rationale in defense and security issues could be difficult (ibid).  Finally, 
Smith and School, claims that these two objections make liberal 
intergovernmentalism not well adapted to explain defense and security integration 
(ibid). 
Smith and School also assert that there is a way to continue to use the 
liberal intergovernmentalism. The development of the ESDP was the result of a 
side payment or issue-linkage in order to come to an agreement on different sets 
of issues since the ESDP have come from a bilateral agreement between British 
Prime Minister Tony Blair and French President Jacques Chirac at a 1998 summit 
in St. Malo. Even, Smith and School claim that Liberal intergovernmentalism is 
particularly unsuited to explain the defense and security integration since its 
model is based on rationally calculating domestic constituents (ibid). 
Finally, Liberal Intergovernmentalism is not open for changes in national 
security interests and preferences and sees them static rather than dynamic. 
Moreover, it depends on the traditional concept of the security, which 
concentrates on material rather than societal values. Finally, identity concept is 
not involved in the theory since LI, like Rationalism ignores the concept of 
identity and sees it as given. This analysis demonstrates that we need a second 
approach which involves these factors. This approach is Social Constructivism.  
 
4.2 ESDP and Social Constructivism 
 
Howorth finds the EU security integration theoretically unproblematic 
from the Constructivist perspective, which suggests that international relations 
can be “socially constructed” in more value-based or normative terms and may 
not be a clash of interests (Howorth in Hill, 2005).  
Constructivism has significant contributions in explaining EU’s external 
strategy. Constructivism claims that the material position of the EU such as its 
role, interest and strategy gains a meaning in the world gradually. Moreover, 
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perceptions of different actors are also effective in giving an international identity 
and some capabilities to Europe (Bretherton and Vogler 1999, 28-32 cited in Hill 
2005). Robert Cooper points out this identity concept and says that the thing the 
EU did is to remove the distinctions between internal and external affairs (Cooper 
2003 in Hill 2005). The EU’s external policy which is produced under the multi-
level structure of the EU is the result of this effort. In addition, Cooper claims that 
the EU should use the multilateralism to define itself and more of the traditional 
kind of hard, or military power (ibid., 164-72). Smith and Steffenson argues that 
even though the EU do not reach the military power the US has, member states 
should cooperate more in military issues in order to have equal rights with the US 
in this sense. (Hill, 2005) 
The classical security complex theory gives an importance to the region 
(Buzan et al. 1998 p. 15); and it points out security is related with power politics 
and survival. This theory is a part of Realist school of thought. However, new 
approaches in security studies which challenge traditional realist theory. It was 
believed that a broadened security agenda should be examined.  One of the most 
prominent of these new approaches is developed by Barry Buzan and Ole Waever 
(Weaver et al. 1993, Weaver 1995, Buzan, Weaver and Wilde 1998). Their study 
is known as the Copenhagen School. 
This new approach of the Copenhagen School is more than the classical 
security complex theory, which focuses on military and power. This approach has 
a social constructivist perspective in order to demonstrate the issues which should 
be securitized. In other words, this approach claims that the security does not only 
include the use of force but also human beings which has impacts on security.  
The concept of security is more flexible for the Social Constructivists so 
there are changes in threat perception and security instruments. Social 
Constructivism has contributed to the concept of security through a broader 
definition of the security concept. Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde 
(Buzan et al. 1998) agree with the Realism, which argues that security is directly 
connected with survival; however, they disagree with the Realism in terms of 
securing survival. They argue that security and threats are not fixed. They are 
socially constructed, and in order to become a threat or a security issue, an issue 
should be presented by an actor which calls for a process of securitization.  
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As mentioned above, security does not have a fixed meaning. it is speech 
act (ibid. p. 39). As a speech act, security is an emergency condition and the right 
to use any means (Wæver cited in ibid.). If a security issue is presented as critical, 
it should be resolved. This issue is a security issue since it is labeled as a threat. It 
is not related with being a real existential threat (Buzan et al. 1998 p. 24). The 
Copenhagen School claims that the issues which will be securitized are ‘speech 
acts’. Thus, they point out that it is not important what security is in reality, but 
what is recognized as a threat.  
The Copenhagen School has a ‘constructivist/realist’ perspective in terms 
of the meaning of security. They divide the security into five sectors which are 
military, environment, economic, societal, and political security. This division has 
not only traditional but also non-traditional issues. In other words, security is the 
result of a social process. This process is the securitisation. In contrast, there is a 
desecuritisation which is the shift of issues from an emergency condition to 
normal. 
Whereas some Constructivists follow a broader definition of the security 
concept, some scholars concentrate on the cultural factors affecting the security 
concept (Katzenstein 1996). Katzenstein argues that states’ interests are not 
stable, and thus can be shaped by external and internal factors (1996 p.3 in 
Rosamond 2000).  In the same way, strategies, identities and interests could 
change over time through internal and external factors in their environment 
(ibid.). This means that interests and preferences are ‘constructed through a 
process of social interaction’ (Katzenstein 1996 p.2 in Rosamond 2000). 
Constructivism is an approach, which claims that cognitive factors in 
determining the foreign policy are important. These factors are ignored by realist 
and liberal theorists. These theorists defend the rationality of actors while 
constructivists defend the bounded rationality meaning that cognitive factors 
constrain decision-makers, and decisions are given under the less than full 
rationality. The constructivism also tries to observe social events objectively, 
based on a more reflective approach (Andreatta cited in Hill 2005). 
 
The Social Constructivists disagree with the Rationalists in terms of 
security policy of EU. Rieker (2004) explains this in three arguments. First, she 
argues that even though EU has not been a unitary actor yet, it has some 
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autonomy which was formed by the gradual establishment of common rules, 
norms and institutions. She asserts that gradually, the EU will be able to influence 
the agendas of the member states in terms of the security policy. According to the 
constructivists, in the EU, member states have a common identity, norms and 
values such as rule of law, human rights, democracy, tolerance etc. (Manners 
2002; Risse 2004 p. 172). These norms constrain behavior of actors, shape their 
preferences and redefine their interests (ibid. p. 163; Sjursen 2002 p. 501).  
The Europeanisation theory (Checkel 2001; Hill and Wallace 1996; 
Manners 2002; Tonra 2003) deals with this process of reconstruction. According 
to Wong, Europeanization asserts that the EU institutions are important in the 
reconstruction process (2005 p. 138). This means that the fundamental building 
bricks of the EU will gradually be reconstructed. In terms of the security 
discourse, Rieker argues that states adapt to their environments by changing the 
security policies at the national level, and by attempting to change the security 
policies at the European level. Even, the concept of the sovereignty has been 
changed and modified in the EU, and state monopoly will be constrained through 
common institutions in the Foreign and Security Policy field like the High 
Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy. She adds that this does 
not mean full power over the member states; however, it will affect the agenda 
and the policy of the member states in this area. 
Second, Rieker agrees with the Copenhagen School and points out the 
constructivists argue that the EU’s security policy is not just related with military 
instruments. Social Constructivists have a broader approach to security including 
all security policy instruments of the EU, threats in EU documents, and policies to 
counter these threats. There are empirical results demonstrating that the EU has 
taken measures against internal and external threats. As an internal measure, in 
the area of Justice and Home Affairs, especially after September 11, the EU 
enforced the domestic police cooperation to counter international crime and 
terrorism. As an external measure, the EU has improved its capacity for civilian 
and military crisis management operations (Rieker 2003).  
Nevertheless, some Social Constructivists argues that without a broader 
definition of security, the EU is a security actor since the EU has a significant 
military capacity with a different military power. Cooper agrees with this 
argument: “it is not true that Europeans have no military capability – after the 
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United States and Russia there is no country that is on pair with the European 
Union’s collective force. Nor is it true that the Europeans are unwilling to use 
force” (Cooper 2003 p.156). He adds: “the Anglo-French artillery rather than 
American bombing that made the difference in Bosnia; and it was the British-
French artillery that were willing to send in troops when the air campaign in 
Kosovo seemed to go nowhere. And Germany – in spite of its long-standing 
reservations about the use of military force – has been active in Kosovo and 
Afghanistan” (ibid.). Moreover, Constructivists point out EU’s crisis management 
operations in Macedonia, Congo and Bosnia prove the military power of the EU.  
Besides the EU crisis management operations, Constructivists mention 
political developments since 2003 to demonstrate the development in the EU’s 
security policy. First one is the formation of a European armament agency, which 
will improve the defence capabilities of the member states, develop the European 
defence capabilities and increase the European armaments cooperation. Second is 
the creation of the European security strategy, which presents main threats, main 
strategic objectives and the policy implications of the EU and demonstrates that 
the EU’s efforts for a coherent foreign policy and effective crisis management. It 
points out the EU should get together its instruments and capabilities to counter 
the identified threats. According to Rieker, the approach in the ESS is consistent 
with the Constructivist approach in the security. Third, the creations of the 
EUMFA, the possibility to create structured cooperation in security and defence, 
and a solidarity clause in the constitutional treaty demonstrate that the EU has 
developed a security policy even though major member states try to take different 
positions related with hot issues in international politics (Rieker, 2004).  
Jeffrey Checkel, James Caporaso, and Joseph Jupille (2003 in Smith and 
School 2004) connect constructivism with preference formation and institutions. 
They argue that joining to an institution affect the preferences. Regarding the 
ESDP, Smith and School claim that even though having different preferences for 
the ESDP, France and Britain negotiated for further institutionalization (Smith 
and School 2004). Rosamond agrees with this argument: institutions such as the 
EU could change not only the strategic choices of states but also most basic 
preferences and very identity of them (2003 p.117 ibid.). 
The Constructivism takes the EU more than a simple set of rules, and 
gives an importance to the social origins of behavior, and to the power of ideas 
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(Bretherton and Vogler 1999, 28-36 in Hill). Like LI, Constructivism claims that 
states are willing to transfer their sovereignty to supranational institutions. 
Nevertheless, in contrast to LI, Constructivism argues that the reason of this 
transfer is not material since states do follow not only material objectives, but also 
ideological motivations. Moreover, Constructivists assert that states may not seem 
willing to transfer sovereignty to institutions and may demand an ultimate control 
over their policies; however, the reason of this is not being unwilling to follow 
institutional rules, but being considered untrustworthy or inappropriate (March 
and Olsen 1998). Thus, Constructivism supports the integration in the security 
policy of the EU since institutions influence the foreign policy decisions and there 
is an institutionalization process in the security policy of the EU. 
Finally, the difference between Rationalism and Social Constructivism 
comes from the strategic adaptation and identity change. On one hand, 
Morgenthau, Keohane, and Moravcsik claim that national interests are 
exogenously given. On the other hand, Social Constructivists argue that national 
interests could change, and norms form identities and influence behaviour 
(Katzenstein 1996 p.5). Wendt (1999 p.113-4) argues that Social Constructivism 
accepts that states behave in accordance with their domestic interests; however, it 
points out these interests could be changed through norms and ideas. Shortly, 
identities and interests are not constant, and change through external and internal 
factors. In the same way, national security and national identity are related so 
national security interests could change when the national identity was changed. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
 
I have throughout the previous chapters analyzed the political developments 
behind the evolution of the ESDP, and the process of security and defence 
integration. To sum up, ESDP has become one of the most prominent policies of 
the EU to shape its external relations and the European integration process. In 
1998, the EU realized the seriousness of the security and defense issues. Since 
2003, security and defense issues gained momentum with the effect of political 
developments and started to move towards a true (European) Common Security 
and Defense Policy. The EU has started the military operations. These missions 
demonstrated the EU’s ability involving in military operations. The drafted 
Constitution’s provisions on security and defense such as common defense as a 
future objective, the mutual defense clause, and the broader definition of the EU’s 
crisis management missions, the possibility of enhanced cooperation on defense, 
the permanent structured cooperation and the creation of the function of the 
EUMFA have important contributions in this progress. 
I also tried to argue why Social Constructivism can explain this integration 
relatively to Realism and Liberal Intergovernmentalism. If I conclude my findings 
in terms of the theoretical framework of my thesis, I will try to answer my 
research questions briefly. 
First, as mentioned above, Realists do not believe the international 
cooperation due to the anarchy. Realism claims that survival and sovereignty are 
the basic for the states; however, the rapid development of the ESDP 
demonstrated that realists should have found an explanation from the perspective 
of their theories.  
In general, Rationalists can explain the reasons of the EU’s ineffectiveness 
and incoherency in world politics; however, they cannot explain the changeable 
character of the EU. They also have difficulties in explaining the reason why 
member states are willing to establish common institutions despite the fact that 
they could not get any material gains. Constructivism argues that the reason of 
this is not material since states do follow not only material objectives, but also 
ideological motivations. 
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Liberal Intergovernmentalism is not open for changes in security interests 
and preferences and sees them static rather than dynamic. It depends on the 
traditional concept of the security, which concentrates on material rather than 
societal values. Identity concept is not involved in the theory and LI ignores the 
concept of identity and sees it as given. This analysis demonstrates that we need a 
second approach which involves these factors since in this point LI cannot explain 
the gradual evolution of the ESDP. The political developments affecting the 
evolution of the ESDP have taken place gradually. This demonstrates us state 
identities could change overtime. Even though the draft constitution of the EU has 
not been ratified yet, this attempt explains that member states can be willing to 
delegate their sovereignties to the institutions.  
Second, the approach which could explain the security and defence 
integration is Social Constructivism. As Rieker points out the constructivists 
argue that the EU’s security policy is not just related with military instruments. 
Social Constructivists have a broader approach to security including all security 
policy instruments of the EU, threats in EU documents, and policies to counter 
these threats. European Security Strategy is the result of these attempts.  
Similarly, the creations of the EUMFA, the possibility to create structured 
cooperation in security and defence, and a solidarity clause in the constitutional 
treaty are the efforts that show the EU has developed a security policy even 
though major member states try to take different positions related with hot issues 
in international politics. 
Moreover, even though EU has not been a unitary actor yet, it has some 
autonomy which was formed by the gradual establishment of common rules, 
norms and institutions. The EU will be able to influence the agendas of the 
member states in terms of the security policy gradually. This argument is 
consistent with the Constructivist approach. 
In conclusion, although there are some limits, political developments I 
mentioned above in the evolution of the EU demonstrate that Social 
Constructivism can explain further security and defence integration better than the 
Liberal Intergovernmentalism and Realism do.   
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